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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IFG LEASING COMPANY, : 
Plaintiff and Respondent, : APPELLANTS' REPLY 
BRIEF 
-v- : 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORP. : 
d/b/a/ RAMADA INN OF EVANSTON, Case No. 20634 
WYOMING? ECOTEK NATIONAL CORP. : 
n/k/a IRVING FINANCIAL CORP.; 
RODNEY F. GORDON; JIM HANSEN; and : 
FRANK A. NELSON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants (defendants below) do not intend to reply 
to all arguments asserted in the Brief of Respondent. However, 
for the sake of clarity, the arguments presented in this Reply 
Brief will be arranged under the same headings set out in the 
points argued in the Brief of Appellants. 
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POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE DISPOSITION OF THE 
COLLATERAL WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE AND THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT. 
In its Respondents Brief plaintiff argues that it only 
needed to prove its claims by a preponderance of the evidencef 
and that defendants failed to "marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings1', citing Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). (See, Respondent's Brief, 
pp. 11-12.) While defendants recognize the requirement imposed 
by this court in Scharf, they also respectfully assert that it 
is impossible to marshal evidence that does not exist. 
Specifically, there was no evidence in the record which 
demonstrated that plaintiff did anything to advertise the 
collateral for sale or to contact potential purchasers other 
than the purchaser to whom the collateral was finally sold. 
It should also be noted that Respondent's Brief did not refer 
to any evidence in the record which would demonstrate any such 
efforts on its part. 
In the recent case of Haggis Management, Inc. v. Turtle 
Management, Inc., 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah 1985) , this court 
refused to allow a deficiency judgment to a secured creditor 
upon its disposition of collateral described as "furniture, 
fixtures, equipment, inventory, accounts receivable and 
proceeds therefrom" used in the operation of a restaurant and 
private liquor club. In that case this court stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Of prime importance are the secured party's 
attempts to obtain a fair price for the collateral 
by advertising the collateral or otherwise notifying 
potential buyers that the collateral is for sale. 
Haggis asserts that, before the sale to Chianti, 
potential buyers were solicited. The record shows 
that there was no advertisement or public notice of 
sale and that, at most, only a few potential buyers 
were contacted and no firm bids were received before 
the sale to Chianti. Such minimal efforts are 
insufficient as a matter of law to establish that 
the collateral was sold in a commercially reasonable 
manner ." (Emphasis addded.) 
Respondent, however, argues that the lower court held 
that the collateral in the instant case was "unique, and much 
of it [was] attached to the property in Evanston." (Citing 
Memorandum Decision of the lower court, at R. 208-209.) 
There are two responses to this argument: 
A. There was no evidence in the record to support this 
statement in the Memorandum Decision. Additionally, this 
statement was not included in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The evidence showed that the collateral 
for the most part consisted of restaurant fixtures and equipment 
(Tr. 167), office furnishings (Tr. 168), lighting fixtures, 
custom built fixtures (such as a bar and back bar) , heat 
exchangers (pumps) , boilers (Tr. 169) used in a motel operation. 
The court might have inferred that the boiler was 
attached to the motel buildings, although no evidence 
specifically so stated. However, there was specific, 
uncontroverted testimony that the heat pumps were never 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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installed or put into service in the motel operation. (Tr. 
96-97, 186-187.) 
Furthermore, the lease agreements specify that the 
collateral is and remains personal property even if it becomes 
attached to real property (Exhibits 1-P, 8-P, 15-P, 22-P and 
29-P, paragraph 16) , and it should also be clear, at least from 
a legal standpoint, that any party in possession of the leased 
collateral could not assert as against the rights of the lessor 
(plaintiff herein) that the property had lost its character 
as personal property by becoming attached to realty. 
B. In ilaggis, the dissent argued that "it is clear 
beyond peradventure that a private club is a unique article 
for which there is only a limited market" (emphasis added), 
and that the efforts of the secured party in soliciting bids 
privately from some potential buyers should be sufficient to 
raise a question of fact which should be tried. (Haggis was 
decided on a Motion for Summary Judgment.) 
Even in the face of this argument, the majority of this 
court held that the disposition of the collateral was 
commercially unreasonable as a matter of law since the secured 
creditor failed to advertise and contacted "only a few potential 
buyers." 
In this case it is uncontroverted in the record that 
the secured party made no effort to advertise the collateral 
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for sale or to contact any potential buyers other than the 
purchaser to whom the collateral was finally sold. 
In view of the foregoing, and inasmuch as the Wyoming 
decisions follow the same lines of authority as the Utah 
decisions (see discussion in Point Two, below), it is 
respectfully submitted that the trial court should have found 
as a matter of law that the failure of the plaintiff to advertise 
the collateral for sale or to contact other potential purchasers 
barred the plaintiff from recovering any deficiency judgment. 
POINT TWO 
HAVING FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S DISPOSITION OF A PART OF THE 
COLLATERAL WAS NOT COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ANY DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT. 
Defendants have asserted that the holding of the lower 
court to the effect that part of the collateral was not disposed 
of in a commercially reasonable manner should have required 
the court to deny any deficiency judgment to the plaintiff, 
citing DeLay First National Bank and Trust Company v. Jacobson 
Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (Neb. 1976). 
Plaintiff disputes this and cites as authority for its 
position the case of In re Nellis, 22 UCCRS 1318 (ED Pa. 1977) . 
Plaintiff summarized the significance of that case as follows: 
"The court found the sale of part of the collateral was 
commercially unreasonable under UCC §9-504(3) , but that finding 
did not prevent the court from holding that the sale of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
remaining collateral was commercially reasonable.11 (See Brief i 
of Respondent, pp.25-26.) Defendants do not agree that the 
foregoing is an accurate statement of the significance of this 
case. i 
However, the real issue underlying both those cases is: 
whether the secured creditor has a right to obtain a deficiency 
judgment if it makes a commercially unreasonable disposition { 
of a part of the collateral. Defendants submit that the 
position taken on this issue in any particular jurisdiction 
is merely an application of the position taken in that l 
jurisdiction on the consequence of a creditor's failure to 
meet the requirement of the Code that every aspect of the 
disposition of the collateral be commercially reasonable. ( 
On this matter, courts have reached varying results, 
but the decisions generally fall into three positions:1 
a. One line of authority, adopted by but a few courts, { 
permits a secured party to recover a deficiency judgment despite 
his non-compliance with the provisions of the UCC relating to 
notice and commercially reasonable disposition. These 
decisions focus on the right given the debtor in § 9-507(1) 
1. These classifications and the authorities for each position 
are more fully explained in Mack Financial Corp. v. Scott, 100 
Idaho 889, 606 P.2d 993 (1980). 
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of the UCC to recover from the secured party any loss occasioned 
by the creditor's failure to comply with the Code.2 
It is apparent from the reliance placed on § 9-507(1) 
in the decision in Nellis, that the bankruptcy court was 
following this line of authority in that case. 
b. A second line of authority holds that the failure 
of the secured party to dispose of the collateral in a 
commercially reasonable manner or to give proper notice does 
not absolutely bar a deficiency judgment. However, in such a 
case it is presumed that the fair market value of the collateral 
at the time of the repossession was equal to the outstanding 
debt and that the debtor owes no deficiency. The secured party 
then has the burden of proving the actual fair market value 
of the collateral at the time of the repossession in order to 
establish a right to a deficiency judgment.^ 
Neither Utah nor Wyoming follow this line of authority,4 
but even if this line of authority were to be adopted in this 
case, the plaintiff would not be entitled to any deficiency 
2. See, Leasco Computer, Inc., v. Sheridan Industries, Inc., 
82 Misc.2d 897, 37lN.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y.Civ.Ct. 1975); Commercial 
Credit Corp. v. Wollgast, 11 Wash.App. 117, 521 P.2d 1191 
(1974). 
3. Mack Financial Corp. v. Scott, supra, (fn. 1); Norton v. 
National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff, 240 Ark. 143, 398 
S.W.2d 538 (1966). 
4. See discussion in subsection c. below, and the Utah and 
Wyoming cases cited therein. 
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i 
judgment because: a) the secured party never did repossess < 
the collateral, 5 and b) there was no competent evidence 
presented at the trial to establish the fair market value of 
the collateral.6 j 
c. The third line of authority holds that the 
creditor's failure to comply with the requirements governing 
disposition of collateral serves as an absolute bar to the ( 
right to a deficiency judgment. 
5. In this regard it becomes very important to note that not 
only did the plaintiff fail to repossess the collateral, 
although requested to do so by defendant Hansen (Tr. 155-156), 
but (without showing any mitigating circumstances) it left the 
collateral in the hands of a court appointed receiver and later 
a Trustee in bankurptcy for more than two years prior to 
disposing of the collateral. According to the testimony of 
Ms. Rakes, by the time of the sale some of the collateral was 
missing and unaccounted for (Tr. 50). This would constitute 
such a failure of the good faith obligations of the secured 
party to obtain the highest price as to take this case out of 
the rationale of both Nellis, (see, particularly the discussion 
at 22 UCCRS 1322) and Business Finance Co., Inc. v. Red Barn, 
Inc. , 517 P.2d 383 (Mont. 1973) cited at pp. 15-16 of 
Respondent's Brief (". . . the nondefaulting party was only 
required to act reasonably under the circumstances, so as to 
not unnecessarily enlarge damages caused by the default." Id., 
517 P.2d at 386.). 
6. The testimony of Susan Trunzo did not constitute evidence 
of the market value of the collateral. She stated that she 
had not seen the collateral and was not familiar with its 
condition (Tr. 165, 175, 179,). All of her testimony was 
hypothetical in nature and only elicited her opinion as to 
what percentage of the original cost of equipment similar to 
that contained on a list which was shown to her could be 
expected to be obtained from a sale under conditions which 
were never specified (presumably upon a liquidation at auction, 
since that was her experience which was used to qualify her as 
a witness). Even as to that matter, her testimony indicated 
that she was not familiar with some of the types of equipment 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Both Utah7 and Wyoming8 follow this line of authority. 
This is also the position adopted in Nebraska9. The 
position taken by the Nebraska Supreme Court in UeLay (that 
the secured creditor who makes a commercially unreasonable 
disposition of a part of the collateral is barred from 
recovering any deficiency judgment) is merely a logical 
application of the underlying requirement that every aspect 
of the disposition of the collateral must be commercially 
reasonable.1® 
Inasmuch as the courts of Utahf Wyoming and Nebraska 
all follow this third line of authority, it is respectfully 
submitted that this court should decline to apply Nellis, as 
urged by plaintiff but should follow the authority of DeLay, 
and hold that the finding by the trial court that a part of 
the collateral was disposed of in a commercially unreasonable 
(cont.) 
listed as collateral (Tr. 169.) 
7. See, Haggis, and cases cited therein. 
8. Seef Aimonetto v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972); Jackson 
State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1978). 
9. See, DeLay First National Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. 
Jacobson Appliance Co., supra; Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 
Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974). 
10. "... the entire disposition of collateral by the secured 
party [must] be viewed as one transaction, and . . . every 
aspect of that transaction [must] be in accord with the 
requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id., 243 N.W.2d 
at 751. 
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manner constitutes an absolute bar to the recovery of any 
deficiency judgment by the plaintiff. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANTS 
GUARANTEED THE LEASES IN QUESTION. 
Defendants contend that the "personal guarantees'1 
introduced into evidence as Exhibits 2-P, 9-P, 16-P, 23-P and 
30-P were improperly admitted because no proper foundation was 
laid for these documents. 
Plaintiff in the Brief of Respondent argues that the 
"personal guarantees" were properly admitted into evidence as 
business records, pursuant to Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Rule 803(6) states that a record of a regularly 
conducted activity can be admitted into evidence as an exception 
to the hearsay rule when it is shown: 
a. That it was made at or near the time, 
b. That it was made by or from information transmitted 
by a person with knowledge, 
c. That it was kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity, and 
d. That it was a regular practice of that business 
activity to make the "record", 
e. All as shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
other qualified witness. 
Plaintiff also asserts that under § 78-25-16.5(3) 
U.C.A., any objections go to the weight rather than to the 
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admissibility of the document. However, it is respectfully 
submitted that § 78-25-16.5(3) refers by its express terms to 
"[a]11 circumstances, other than those set forth in subsection 
(2)", and that subsection (2) requires substantially the same 
showing required as a foundation by Rule 803 or the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, so that both of these bases should be determined 
by the evidence presented as a foundation for the admission 
of the documents in question as a business record. 
Plaintiff asserts that the requirements of Rule 803 
were met by the testimony of Ms. B.J. Rakes, a senior adjuster 
for plaintiff who first became employed by plaintiff on January 
4, 1984. (Tr. 13.) The documents in question all bore dates 
prior to December 31, 1981. 
When Ms. Rakes was presented as a witness, counsel for 
plaintiff began to have her identify documents to be used as 
exhibits without any specific attempt to lay the foundation 
required by Rule 803 for the admission of those documents. 
Thereupon, Mr. Barber, counsel for some of the defendants, 
asked Ms. Rakes on voir dire the following questions: 
"Q: Do you know of your personal knowledge what 
the customs and procedures of IFG Leasing were in 
1981 and 1980? 
"A: Could you be a little more specific as to 
what exactly do you mean? 
nQ: Do you know what their procedures were with 
respect to the handling of completion certificates 
in 1980 or 1981? 
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ffA: I was not with the company in 1981. I have 
come in contact with a great deal of, handled a great 
number of leases, 
"Q: Do you know how these things were handled? 
Were they dated at the time or dated somewhere else 
as a matter of common procedure in 1981? 
"A: They were dated the days they were signed. 
f,Q: What is the basis for your knowledge about 
the practice of the company in that respect in 1981? 
How do you know what you just said? That's my 
question. 
flA: From the experience Ifve had with the company, 
my contact with the leases. 
lfQ: Did someone tell you that? 
lfA: Not specifically. 
"Q: Do you have any other basis for that other 
than just reading the documents and seeing their 
form? 
"A: I know what the general practice of the company 
was. I have to know. 
ffQ: Now, I need to ask you one more time. How is 
it that you know that? 
"A: From the contact I've had with the leases. 
"Q: In 1981? 
"A: From the contact I have had with the leases. 
ffQ: And that's with the physical documents 
themselves? 
"A: With the general handling of the documents. 
"Mr. Barber: I think, Your Honor, she's probably 
not qualified to testify based on that answer about 
the common practices of the company in 1981. 
"Mr. Reading: Your Honor, let me ask a few more 
questions." (Tr. 21—22.) 
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Thereupon followed the precise testimony of Ms. Rakes 
which plaintiff asserts "served as foundation for admission 
into testimony of all the personal guaranties as business 
records" (Respondent's Brief, p. 32). Since her testimony, 
upon which plaintiff relies, is set forth in full on pages 33 
and 34 of Respondent's Brief, it will not be duplicated here. 
However, a fair summary of her testimony in that extract is 
as follows: 
That she is in charge of a collection department 
of plaintiff which handles 800 accounts, approximately 
200 of which were signed on or before 1980-1981; that 
she talked with individuals [presumably other company 
employees] who signed these documents and discussed 
collecting the accounts; and that it is her 
understanding that the practices of the company "during 
those times" were not different from what she is 
experiencing today at the plaintiff company. 
While, it should be noted that Ms. Rakes had previously 
testified that she first came into contact with the records 
concerning this case and became the custodian of that file at 
the end of July, 1984 (Tr. 13-14) , it is respectfully submitted 
that the testimony, which plaintiff asserts served as the 
foundation for the admission of the "personal guarantees" into 
evidence fails to meet the other foundational requirements set 
forth in Rule 803. 
Plaintiff also implies that Mr. Marshall (counsel for 
defendant Nelson) waived any objection to the admission into 
evidence of the "personal guarantees" as business records. 
(See Respondent's Brief, page 34.) The quotation in 
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Respondent's Brief does not set out the context in which the ( 
statement was made, and plaintiff's suggestion that it may 
have constituted a waiver is, at best, misleading. 
At that point in the trial (page 20 of the transcript ( 
of the testimony) no documents had been offered into evidence, 
and the witness was testifying about Exhibit 4-P, which she 
described as a "completion certificate" (Tr. 18). Mr. Marshall \ 
objected that the witness was testifying as to the date on 
which the document was signed and as to what the plaintiff 
company did at that time concerning the lease transactions in ' 
question. Thereupon the following occurred: 
"Judge Billings: Let's clarify that. I'll overrule 
that objection but counsel will be instructed that 
this witness should only testify from the normal custom 
and procedure of the company and what these documents 
themselves indicate on their face. 
"Mr. Reading: And that's fine. And I think we've 
done that, but — 
"Mr. Marshall: I'm not objecting to the documents 
as being business records of the company. That's not 
the point. 
"Mr. Reading: Judge, I am interspersing as we go 
along the general practice of IFG. 
"Judge Billings: You must be cautious to phrase 
your questions indicating that you are requesting a 
response as to the normal and general practice as 
opposed to what occurred in this transaction." (Tr. 
20-21) 
When taken in context, and since this statement of Mr. 
Marshall was not made in connection with an offer of any exhibit 
into evidence, it should be clear that no waiver of any objection 
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was intended by the statement of counsel referred to in this 
instance. 
However, at a later time plaintiff did offer Exhibit 2-
P (the first "personal guarantee") for admission into evidence. 
At that time Mr. Marshall made the following objection: 
"Judge Billings: * * * Do you have an objection 
to the receipt of the document as a business record? 
"Mr. Marshall: Of course, I do have an objection 
to the receipt of the document as to what the document 
purports to be, Your Honor, for any purpose. Now, she 
can say she found it in the company files, but beyond 
that I don't think this witness is qualified to testify 
to this by her own testimony here, Your Honor. On 
that basis I would object to the admission of the 
document." 
The trial court thereupon ruled that the document would 
be admitted into evidence as a business record with a proper 
foundation having been laid (Tr. 28). It is respectfully 
submitted that the ruling of the trial court was error, and 
the document should not have been admitted into evidence due 
to the failure of the plaintiff to lay a proper foundation as 
required by Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Thereafter, at the suggestion of the trial court and 
by stipulation of the parties (Tr. 35-36), the other "personal 
guarantees" (Exhibits 9-P, 16-P, 23-P and 30-P) were also 
admitted into evidence without any additional foundation being 
laid, but subject to the same objections made as to Exhibit 2-
P (Tr. 36-43). 
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Defendants have further objected to the introduction 
into evidence of the "personal guarantees11 on the basis that 
they are altered documentsr since the only thing that ties a 
"guarantee" to a particular lease is the identifying number in 
a box situated in the upper right-hand corner of the "guarantee" 
documents, and the trial court found that the documents were 
not identified by any lease number at the time they were signed. 
(Findings of Fact No. 6 — see addendum.) The objection of 
defendants is based upon § 78-25-17 U.C.A., a copy of which 
is included in the Addendum to this brief. 
Plaintiff argues, however, that §78-25-17 U.C.A. 
permits the introduction into evidence of such documents upon 
a showing that the alteration was made with the consent of the 
parties affected by it, or that the alteration does not change 
the meaning or language of the instrument. Plaintiff argues 
that "plaintiff carried its prima facie burden of proof" because 
defendants were familiar with plaintiff's course of business 
in adding the numbers to the guarantees after the leases were 
executed. (Respondent's Brief p. 37.) 
However, plaintiff fails to cite any evidence in the 
record to show either: a) that defendants were in fact familiar 
with this "practice" of the plaintiff, or b) that defendants 
consented to the application of such numbers by plaintiff to 
the documents in question. Defendants respectfully assert 
that there is no such evidence in the record, and that 
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plaintiff1s argument is no better supported by the evidence 
than is the ruling of the trial court in this regard* 
For all of the foregoing reasons defendants respectfully 
submit that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence 
the "personal guarantees" of the defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants renew their assertion (in the alternative) 
that: 
1. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
because the evidence presented at trial did not show that 
plaintiff disposed of any part of the collateral in a 
commercially reasonable manner. 
2. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
because the trial court correctly concluded that the retention 
of the art piece by plaintiff was not a commercially reasonable 
disposition which should preclude plaintiff from obtaining 
any deficiency judgment. 
3. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
because the finding of the court that defendants had guaranteed 
the leases in question was based upon evidence which was 
improperly admitted into evidence. 
Defendants also reassert (for the reasons stated in 
Appellants' Brief) that the judgment of the trial court should 
be reduced by the sum of $23,805.65 (plus interest calculated 
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thereon) because the defendants never agreed to pay the residual 
value of the equipment, and that the judgment of the trial 
court for attorney1s fees should be reduced to an amount not 
in excess of $10f000.00. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the 
foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief upon the plaintiff, by 
mailing the same to Plaintiff's Attornies, J. Bruce Reading 
and Michael W. Spence, 261 EastJlpO South, Second Floor, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 this /<- /., day of ^ ov,ember, 1985. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2. JUDGMENT 
3. SECTION 78-25-17, U.C.A. 1953 
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J. BRUCE READING, No. 2700 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-7870 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake Ccuntv Utah 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IFG LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION d/b/a RAMADA INN, 
EVANSTON, WYOMING, et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-83-8536 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before 
the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge of the above-entitled 
Court, during the time period of February 21, 1985 through February 
25, 1985, with the plaintiff being represented by Mr. Bruce 
Reading, attorney at law, the defendants Hansen and Gordon being 
represented by Mr. James Barber, attorney at law, and defendant 
Nelson being represented by Mr. John Marshall, attorney at law, 
and the Court having heard evidence and accepted exhibits and hav-
ing reviewed both testimony and documents after taking the matter 
under advisement now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the defendants are residents of Salt Lake 
County, and the Court has jurisdiction of both the individual 
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defendants and the subject matter of this litigation. 
2. That the corporate defendants Ecotek National 
n/k/a Irving Financial Corporation and Bonneville Development 
Corporation are Utah corporations doing business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and presently, are under the protection 
of the United States Bankruptcy Court having filed Chapter 11 
proceedings. 
3. That during the time period of October 1980 through 
September 1981, the individual defendants were principals in 
the control and operation of Bonneville Development Corporation,] 
each serving on the board of directors and as officers of the 
corporation, and holding existing shareholder interests or the 
right to acquire that position. 
4. That the defendant Bonneville Development Corpora-
tion d/b/a Ramada Inn, Evanston, Wyoming executed and delivered 
to the plaintiff the following leases on or about the dates 
indicated: 
a. On or about March 6, 1983, lease no. 56809; 
b. On or about May 14, 1981, lease no. 56810; 
c. On or about June 20, 1981, lease no. 56811; 
d. On or about July 29, 1981, lease no. 56812; and 
e. On or about September 3, 1981, lease no. 57938. 
5. That on or about the dates of the execution of 
each of the five leases, each of the individual defendants, 
Hansen, Gordon, and Nelson, executed a continuing and unconditional 
guaranty agreement whereby they agreed to perform, pay, and 
2
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discharge all of the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation's 
obligations under the respective lease agreements. 
6. At the time when guaranty agreements were presented 
with each of the above five leases, the guaranty agreements 
were not dated and were not identified by lease number. 
7. That each of the five leases were funded by the 
plaintiff, and the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
received the use of personal property pursuant to those leases. 
8. That the last payment made by the defendants under 
any of the lease contracts was on May 13, 1982. 
9. Plaintiff attempted to force payments .during the 
summer of 1982, but did not repossess the collateral. 
10. The defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
d/b/a Ramada Inn, Evanston, Wyoming was placed in receivership 
on the 5th day of October, 1982. 
11. That the defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
filed for protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah on May 31, 1983. 
12. That on or about March 30, 1984, letters were 
sent to the defendants Gordon, Hansen, and Nelson informing 
them of the date after which the personal property, which was 
the subject matter of the leases, would be sold at private or 
public sale. 
13. The personal property was sold to Commercial Security 
Bank and First Security Bank during the month of September, 
1984 at private sale for the amount of Eighty Five Thousand 
Dollars ($85,000.00). 
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14. Expert witness testimony placed the value of the 
personal property at fifteen to twenty-five percent of the original 
purchase value. The actual amount received was approximately 
eighteen percent (18%) of its original value. 
15. No written notification of acceleration of payments 
pursuant to paragraph 19(b) of the leases, was ever sent by the ; 
plaintiff to the defendants..:'.''Such notification was: only given by 
filing of the complaint in this matter on or about 12th day of 
December, 1983. 
16. As a part of plaintifffs bargain, it had established 
residual or salvage value in the equipment of Twenty-Three Thousand 
Eight Hundred Five Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($23,805.63). 
17. At the time of the sale of the personal property, 
a wood carving was retained by the plaintiff and not sold with 
the other personal property. 
18. A check in the amount of Six Thousand Dollars 
($6,000.00) paid by the plaintiff for certain items of personal 
property under the leases was never cashed. 
19. Attached hereto, as appendix "A" to these findings, 
is the recap of all amounts due and owing and amounts credited 
under each of the leases for the sale of equipment. 
20. The defendant Bonneville Development Corporation 
agreed, pursuant to the lease agreements, to pay any reasonable 
attorney fees. 
21. Plaintiff's counsel has submitted an affidavit 
in support of attorney's fees with said affidavit incorporating 
4 213 
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actual time and charges made in this matter. 
22. All of the parties agree that the leases were, 
in fact, financing agreements that were subject to the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the guaranties of the individual defendants, 
Rodney F, Gordon, Jim Hansen, and Frank A. Nelson (exhibits 
2, 9, 16, 23, and 30) were intended by the parties to guarantee 
the leases entered into by Bonneville Corporation and are legally 
binding contracts. Although these documents may have been blank 
as to lease number, date, and even the equipment covered, the 
defendants knew or should have known that the documents were 
intended for the five leases at issue. 
2. That the sale of the collateral was commercially 
reasonable and conformed to the requirements of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The sale was a private sale, after notice 
was given to the individual defendants, and the price obtained 
was commercially reasonable. 
3. The Court finds that the sale of the wood carving 
was not commercially reasonable and allows an offset of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the price of this carving. 
4. The Court finds that the Six Thousand Dollar 
($6,000.00) check that was not cashed should also be allowed 
as an offset. 
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5. The Court finds that the damages should be computed 
as follows: 
a. All principal amounts due and owing as of 
the date of the filing of the complaint should earn interest 
at the the statutory rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
b. The plaintiff should be awarded the residual 
value of the equipment in the amount of Twenty-Three Thousand 
Eight Hundred Five Dollars and Sixty-Five Cents ($23,805.65). 
c. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56809 is One Hundred Sixty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred 
Ninety-Seven Thousand and Ninety-Seven Cents ($163,997.97). 
d. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56810 is One Hundred Seventy-Four Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Nine Dollars and Fourteen Cents ($174,879.14). 
e. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56811 is Three Hundred Five Thousand Eight Hundred 
Forty-Five Dollars and Sixty-Three Cents ($305,845.63). 
f. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 56812 is One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred 
Seventy-Seven Dollars and Ninety-Two Cents ($148,677.92). 
g. The amount of damages pursuant to lease 
number 57938 is Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Sixteen Dollars 
and Ninety-One Cents ($21,416.91). 
The total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff 
is Eight Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Three 
Dollars and Twenty-Two Cents ($838,623.22). 
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6. Defendants should be awarded an offset against 
these damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) 
and Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) for the unpaid check. 
7. The total amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff 
should be Eight Hundred Twenty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-
Three Dollars and Twenty-Two Cents ($822,623.22). 
8. In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff should 
be awarded its attorney's fees .in the amount of •fipupntsen Thons-affd 
lUJUAoU, 4^-1^&UJU^ . C*i*,4?r»«ro V QK 
•Dollarn—(?1*7, 000 .00) .• J £r~>~ (?r7i 000.00) .• 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded its costs incurred 
herein in the amount of Three Hundred Two Dollars ($302.00). 
DATED this l9 day of March, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Qwfc 
• .G^etw^ P . b ^ ^ 
0«»>tity Cfcrfc 
kit /?)• £ti^r) 
l. Bi l l ings (J District Court Judge 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on the //tyt day of March, 1985, 
I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to the following: 
John G. Marshall 
Attorney for defendant Nelson 
525 East 300 South, No. 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
James N. Barger 
Attorney for defendants Hansen and Gordon 
255 East 400 South, No. 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ATTACHMENT A to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
IFG Leasing Company v. Bonneville Development Corporation, Civil No. C-83-8536 
Amount Interest 0 
Lease (Remaining lease Amounts Received 10% from 12/12/83 Bal5 
Number Date payments) Accounts Receivable Sales Taxes (Date complaint filed) Du 
56809 
56810 
56811 
56812 
57938 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/21/85 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/12/85 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/21/85 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/12/85 
I 
5/13/82 
9/28/84 
2/21/85 
$162,280.08 
$172,385.24 
$301,486.67 
$146,558.34 
$21,111.46 
$16,982.84 
$17,397.21 
$30,428.76 
$14,791.41 
$2,130.55 
$679.31 
- $695.89 
$1,217.15 
$591.65 
$85.23 
**$12,849.03 
$ 5,851.70 
**$13,649.13 
$ 6,241.98 
**$23,871.14 
$10,916.58 
**$11,604.21 
$ 5,306.78 
$ 1,671.56 
$764.44 
• $162,2 
$158,1 
$163,9 
$172,3 
$168,6 
$174,8 
$301,4 
$294,9 
$305.8 
$146,5 
$143,3 
$148,6 
$21,1 
$20,6 
$21,4: 
••Calculated from date of filing of complaint, December 12, 1983. Total: $838,6 
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J. BRUCE READING, No. 2700 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IFG LEASING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNEVILLE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION d/b/a RAMADA INN, 
EVANSTON, WYOMING, et al., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-83-8536 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court from 
February 21, 1985 through February 25, 1985 with the plaintiff 
appearing through its authorized representatives and through 
its counsel, J. Bruce Reading/ the defendants Hansen and Gordon 
being represented by Mr. James Barber, attorney at law, and the 
defendant Nelson appearing in person and being represented by 
Mr. John Marshall, attorney at law, and the Court having heretofore 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law now enters 
the following judgment. 
1. The guaranties of the individual defendants 
Rodney F. Gordon, Jim Hansen, and Frank A. Nelson (exhibits 
2, 9, 16, 23, and 30) were intended by the parties to guarantee 
the lease agreements entered into by Bonneville Development 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Corporation and are legally binding contracts. 
2. The sale of the collateral was commercially 
reasonable and conformed to the requirements of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, The sale of the wood carving was not commercially 
reasonable. 
3. It is ordered that the defendants be allowed the 
following offsets: 
a. Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the wood 
carving; and 
* b. Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) for the uncashed 
c h e c k . . • ;' -'/.. . 
4. All principal amounts due and owing as of the date 
of the filing of the complaint shall earn interest at the 
statutory rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
5. Damages shall be computed regarding the leases as 
follows: 
a. Residual value in the equipment: $23,805.65 
b. Damages pursuant to 
lease number 56809: $163,997.97 
c. Damages pursuant to 
lease number 56810: $174,879.14 
d. Damages pursuant to 
lease number 56811: w * $305,845.63 
e. Damages pursuant to 
lease number 56812: $148,677.92 
f. Damages pursuant to 
* lease number 56938 $21,416.91 
Total amount of damages suffered 
by plaintiff: : — " $838,623.22 
_. 251 
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6c The total amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff 
shall be Eight Hundred Twenty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Three 
Dollars and Twenty-Two Cents ($822,623.22), and judgment is hereby 
awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendants in said amount. 
7. In addition, plaintiff shall be-.awarded its reasonable 
[v \*,4*s- in)) QA . 
attorney's fees in the sum of .'SuvenLubui Thuuaand Dolaars 
($1.7, 000^0,0) . 
8. Plaintiff should be awarded its costs incurred 
in the amount of Three Hundred Two Dollars ($302*00). 
9. The above amounts shall accrue interest at the rate 
of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of judgment until 
paid in full. 
DATED this $ day of March, 1985. 
ATTEST BY THE COURT: 
H. DIXON HiNDLEY 
Cfcrt 
f i^^ .^ffctey— 
lllllll ' f Q , ^ . . A . , f+-*i. Dtputy Cfrwfc h M. Billings J/ 
District Court Judge 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 1985, 
I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Judgment to the following: 
Mr. John G. Marshall 
Attorney for defendant Nelson 
525 East 300 South, No. 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. James N. Barber 
Attorney for defendants Hansen and Gordon 
255 East 400 South, No. 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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78-25-17. Writings bearing obvious alterations—Explanation required. 
—The party producing as genuine a writing which has been altered, or 
appears to have been altered after its execution in a part material to 
the question in dispute must account for the appearance of alteration. 
He1'may show that the alteration was made by another without his 
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, 
or otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration does 
not change .the meaning or language of the instrument. If he does this, 
he.may give the writing in evidence, but not otherwise. 
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